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I. INTRODUCTION 
Computers and the Internet have changed and are 
continuing to change the way governments, militaries, 
businesses, and other organs of society manage their activities. 
While computers can improve efficiency, they are vulnerable to 
cyber–attack, cyber–crime, and cyber–espionage.1 The 
international community, states, and businesses are still 
adapting to the unique set of challenges posed by cyber–attack, 
cyber–crime, and cyber–espionage. States are creating military 
operations that specialize in cyber–attack and defense to adapt 
to these relatively new threats to national security operations. 2  
 
       *     Regents Professor and Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, 
University of Minnesota Law School. The author thanks Quin Ryan for her 
assistance on this article. This Article was prepared for the Minnesota Journal 
of International Law’s 2013 Symposium. To see a video recording of the 
discussion that took place, please see the Minnesota Journal of International 
Law’s website, http://www.minnjil.org/?page_id=913. 
 1. See generally J. Nicholas Hoover, Cyber Attacks Becoming Top Terror 
Threat, FBI Says, INFO. WK., Feb. 1, 2012, 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/security/232600046 
(emphasizing the increasing importance of cyber–attacks in modern national 
security concerns).  
 2. E.g., Joanna Stern & Luis Martinez, Pentagon Cyber Command: 
Higher Status Recommended, ABC NEWS, May 2, 2012, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/pentagon–cyber–command–unit–
recommended–elevated–combatant–status/story?id=16262052 (discussing the 
United States’ own “Cyber Command Unit” known as CYBERCOM, currently 
under the purview of the U.S. Strategic Command). Estonia created the Cyber 
Defense League in response to the DDoS attacks in 2007. Tom Gjelten, 
Volunteer Cyber Army Emerges in Estonia, NPR, Jan. 4, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/2011/01/04/132634099/in–estonia–volunteer–cyber–army–
defends–nation, see infra part II.A (outlining the DDoS attacks in 2007). Iran 
announced the creation of its own military cyber–unit in 2011. Cyberattacks on 
Iran—Stuxnet and Flame, N.Y. TIMES, updated Aug. 9, 2012, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/computer_malwa
re/stuxnet/index.html. The United Kingdom developed the Defense Cyber 
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In the United States there have been multiple attempts to 
address the flaws in the existing legal structures in order to 
better address the threat posed by computer network 
operations.3 The first legislative attempt was in April 2012, 
when the United States House of Representatives passed a 
cyber–security bill “which called for more information sharing 
between national security and intelligence agencies and 
businesses.”4 A few months later a second cyber–security bill 
was introduced in the Senate, which would establish “optional 
standards for the computer systems that oversee the country’s 
critical infrastructure.”5 Unable to reach a compromise in the 
legislature, President Barack Obama reportedly signed Policy 
Directive 20 which established “a broad and strict set of 
standards to guide the operations of federal agencies in 
confronting threats in cyberspace.”6 The directive provides 
much needed updates to cyber–security protocols in part by 
distinguishing between network defense and cyber operations;7 
however, it does not replace the need for legislative action to 
protect private networks.8 At the international level the lack of 
standards is even more pronounced and the tenuous 
applicability of international legal paradigms to cybersecurity 
issues creates uncertainty and difficulty in pursuing any 
 
Operations Group, and also has two units which are working on an offensive 
capability to strike back at enemies trying to launch electronic attacks. 
Duncan Gardham, Britain Prepares for Cyber War, TELEGRAPH, Nov. 25, 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8915871/Britain–prepares–
for–cyber–war.html. 
 3. See generally Michael S. Schmidt, Cybersecurity Bill is Blocked in 
Senate by G.O.P. Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/us/politics/cybersecurity–bill–blocked–by–
gop–filibuster.html; see also Ed O’Keefe & Ellen Nakashima, Cybersecurity 
Bill Fails in Senate, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national–security/cybersecurity–bill–
fails–in–senate/2012/08/02/gJQADNOOSX_story.html. 
 4. Schmidt, supra note 3; see also O’Keefe & Nakashima, supra note 3 
(discussing other legislative efforts prior to the cyber–security bill the article 
focuses on). 
 5. Schmidt, supra note 3; see generally O’Keefe & Nakashima, supra note 
3 (explaining the procedural issue the bill ran up against in the Senate). 
 6. Ellen Nakashima, Obama Issues Guidance on Cyberwarfare, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 15, 2012, at A7. 
 7. Network defense is what is done within one’s own network, and cyber–
operations are actions taken outside of one’s own network space. The 
distinction is expected to help guide officials actions and authorize some 
cyber–operations that are defensive in nature. Id. 
 8. Id. (outlining the need for additional cyber–security policy for the 
private sector, either in the form of legislative action, or executive order).  
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standards or norms.  
The legal challenge of addressing cyber operations is 
complicated by the broad variety of computer network 
operations possible and by the broad variety of potential actors. 
A computer network operation could be perpetrated by a lone 
hacker who shuts down a government website. That operation 
may require a much different response than when a computer 
network operation, executed by government agents, causes a 
gas pipeline to explode in another country. Identifying a 
computer network operation as a use of military force or armed 
attack may be analyzed under the United Nations Charter 
while other computer misuse may be assessed as espionage or 
other criminal offenses, depending upon issues of scale, 
attribution, intent, and consequences. Identifying the different 
types of computer network operations, as a cyber–attack, 
cyber–crime, or cyber–espionage is important in analyzing an 
appropriate legal response. 
This Article explores different types of computer network 
operations and the scope of existing legal paradigms that can 
be applied to computer network operations. This Article 
examines three recent examples of computer network 
operations and analyzes the situations to determine the types 
of computer network operation and what, if any, legal 
operations apply. Finally, this Article discusses the limitations 
of existing legal paradigms, and analyzes the attributes and 
weaknesses of the three more prominent proposals for 
addresses regulation of international computer network 
operations.  
 
II. ESTONIA, STUXNET, AND FLAME: EXAMPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS 
A. ESTONIA 
On April 27, 2007, Estonian officials moved a Soviet–era 
memorial celebrating an unknown Russian who died fighting 
the Nazis during World War II.9 The memorial had long been a 
gathering place for both Russian and Estonian nationalist 
groups, so officials moved the memorial from Central Tallinn to 
 
 9. Estonia Removes Soviet Memorial, BBC NEWS, Apr. 27, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6598269.stm (specifying the date the statue 
was moved, and the significance of the statue); Daniel J. Ryan et al., 
International Cyberlaw: A Normative Approach, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1161, 1164 
(2011). 
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the Tallinn Military Cemetery outside of town.10 In anticipation 
of the move, thousands of ethnically Russian Estonians 
protested.11 The protests eventually turned violent, and led to 
rioting, hundreds of arrests, and one death.12 This event began 
a series of Distributed Denial–of–Service (DDoS)13 attacks 
launched against several Estonian national websites.14 
Estonian government websites that would generally receive 
1,000 visits a day were receiving 2,000 visits every second, 
causing the websites to be shut down for several hours at a 
time.15 The attacks became more sophisticated and persisted 
for several weeks until NATO and the United States sent 
security experts to Estonia to investigate and protect the 
computers from further attack.16 Estonia initially blamed the 
Russian government for the attacks;17 others claimed that 
Russia worked with cyber–criminals making their large 
botnets18 available for misuse.19 At this time investigations 
indicate the attacks were not affiliated with the Russian 
government, but rather the product of “spontaneous anger from 
a loose federation of separate attackers.”20 
 
 10. Ryan et al., supra note 9, at 1164; Estonia Removes Soviet Memorial, 
supra note 9. 
 11. See Ryan et al., supra note 9, at 1164; Estonia Removes Soviet 
Memorial, supra note 9. 
 12. See Ryan et al., supra note 9, at 1164; Estonia Removes Soviet 
Memorial, supra note 9. 
 13. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self 
Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 444–45 
(Spring 2012) define Distributed Denial–of–service (DDoS), as a DoS that 
launches requests simultaneously from multiple computers, creating a much 
larger scale attack on the targeted computers or websites than a simple DoS 
attack. DoS is a type of cyber–attack that cripples the computer or websites’ 
processing speeds or completely preventing a user from using the system by 
overwhelming the target with data and requests, id. DDoS attacks can also be 
combined with other types of attacks such as malicious software, see id. at 
442–43; see infra note 52.  
 14. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32114, BOTNETS, 
CYBERCRIME, AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES 
FOR CONGRESS 7 (2009). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 8.  
 18. “Botnets, or ‘Bot Networks,’ are made up of vast numbers of 
compromised computers that have been infected with malicious code, and can 
be remotely–controlled through commands sent via the Internet.” Id. at 5; see 
also, Kesan & Hayes, supra note 1313, at 443 (describing potential overlap 
between Botnets, DDoS attacks, and other types of malicious code).  
 19. WILSON, supra note 14, at 8. 
 20. Id.  
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B. STUXNET 
On June 1, 2012, officials of President Barack Obama’s 
administration admitted that the computer worm,21 Stuxnet, 
was a joint project between the United States and Israel 
designed to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program.22 The “Olympic 
Games” program23 began in 2006 under President George W. 
Bush’s administration and flourished under the Obama 
administration.24 The Stuxnet worm, developed within Olympic 
Games, was first introduced into the Iranian computer system 
in 2008, at an underground facility at Natanz, through an 
employee’s flash drive.25 Stuxnet was designed to suddenly 
speed up or slow down the spinning of centrifuges used to 
enrich uranium, causing their parts to break and thereby 
crippling the entire uranium enrichment operation.26 The most 
impressive aspect of the Stuxnet worm was that while it was 
changing the speeds of the centrifuges, the computers in the 
operation room would report normal functioning of the 
centrifuges indicating no problems.27  
The Stuxnet operation was working successfully until an 
error in the programming28 allowed the worm to be released 
after infecting an engineer’s computer. The engineer took his 
 
 21. Stuxnet is more accurately described as a “rootkit.” Kesan & Hayes, 
supra note 13, at 442–43l. Rootkits are malicious software programs which use 
system modification to hide files, processes, programs, and behaviors. Id. at 
442. 
 22. David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped up Wave of Cyberattacks Against 
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 1, 2012, at A1. 
 23. “Stuxnet” is the name given to the malicious code by computer 
security experts studying the worm. Id. “Olympic Games” is the name given to 
the program under which Stuxnet was developed by the Bush administration. 
Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. (explaining how Stuxnet was introduced into Iran’s underground 
nuclear facility, and how crucial the “beacon” virus, which was used to collect 
information about Iran’s nuclear facility, was to designing Stuxnet to attack 
Iran’s nuclear industrial control systems); see also Nicole Perlroth, 
Researchers Find Clues in Malware, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/technology/researchers–link–flame–virus–
to–stuxnet–and–duqu.html?_r=2&ref=stuxnet& (noting that researchers 
believe the Duqu virus, was the “beacon” behind gathering the information 
necessary to develop stuxnet); Duqu: Steal Everything, KAPERSKY LAB, 
http://www.kaspersky.com/about/press/duqu (explicating the scope and threat 
of the Duqu virus). 
 26. Sanger, supra note 22.  
 27. Id. 
 28. The exact source of the programming error is unknown; some within 
President Obama’s administration blame the Israeli programmers. Id. 
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computer home with him, and the worm spread when he 
connected to the Internet, thereby infecting over 100,000 
computers worldwide and exposing Stuxnet to the public.29 
Stuxnet’s intent and objective were not immediately clear to 
those persons who encountered it. After much consideration the 
Obama administration decided to continue the Stuxnet attacks 
since the worm was still effectively dismantling the Iranian 
nuclear program.30 The overall effectiveness of Stuxnet is 
unclear, with the United States government arguing that it 
delayed Iran’s nuclear development by one–and–a–half to two 
years,31 while others report that Iran was able to successfully 
contain much of the damage caused by Stuxnet.32 Stuxnet was 
programmed to self–destruct on June 24, 2012.33 
 
C. FLAME 
On May 28, 2012, the Kaspersky Lab34 in Moscow 
announced the discovery of malicious software codenamed 
Flame.35 The primary function of Flame is to collect 
information.36 Flame steals valuable information from infected 
 
 29. Id.; see also NICOLAS FALLIERE ET AL., SYMANTEC SEC. RESPONSE, 
W32.STUXNET DOSSIER 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/w
hitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf; The Stuxnet Outbreak: A Worm in the 
Centrifuge, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2010, at 63 (claiming that 45,000 computers 
had been infected with Stuxnet); Wayne Madsen, Stuxnet: A Violation of US 
Computer Security Law, OPINION MAKER (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.opinion–
maker.org/2011/01/stuxnet–a–violation–of–us–computer–security–law/ 
(arguing that over 100,000 computers had been infected with Stuxnet). 
 30. See Sanger, supra note 22. 
 31. Id.  
 32. See Jeremy Richmond, Evolving Battlefields: Does Stuxnet 
Demonstrate a Need for Modifcation to the Law of Armed Conflict?, 35 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 842, 858 (2012). But see id. at 859 (arguing that even if 
Iran contained much of the damage, they were harmed in other ways such as 
shortage of certain metals needed for the machines and the psychological 
impact of having a secure facility infiltrated). 
 33. Id. at 856. 
 34. Kaspersky Lab is a Russian producer of antivirus software. Thomas 
Erdbrink, Iran Confirms Attack by Virus that Collects Information, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A4. 
 35. Kaspersky Lab and ITU Research Reveals New Advanced Cyber 
Threat, KASPERSKY LAB (May 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2012/Kaspersky_Lab_and_ITU_R
esearch_Reveals_New_Advanced_Cyber_Threat [hereinafter Kapersky Lab] 
(announcing the discovery of the malicious program codenamed Flame, found 
during an investigation prompted by the International Telecommunications 
Union). 
 36. Id. 
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computers ranging from, but not limited to, computer display 
contents, documents, stored files, password information, 
contact data, audio conversations, and monitoring of Skype.37 
The Kapersky Lab found that “[t]he complexity and functioning 
of the newly discovered malicious program exceed those of all 
other cyber menaces known to date.”38 One reason is size. In 
comparison to a study done in 2010, Flame, which is believed to 
have been introduced in 2010,39 is nearly sixty times the 
average size of other known malicious programs.40 Kaspersky 
Lab researchers announced that while it is likely that Flame is 
part of the same campaign as Stuxnet, it appears to have been 
written by a different group of programmers.41 When Flame 
was discovered, Kaspersky found that most of the infected 
computers were in the Middle East.42 Iran had the highest 
number of Flame infections; Israel, the Palestinian territories, 
Sudan, Syria, and Lebanon also had substantial numbers of 
infected computers.43 Many commenters suspect that Israel is 
responsible for the Flame program, and while Israel has not 
taken responsibility for Flame, they have also done little to 
deflect suspicion.44 The Washington Post has also asserted that 
 
 37. See Erdbrink, supra note 34; Kaspersky Lab, supra note 35. 
 38. Kaspersky Lab, supra note 35. 
 39. Id. (“Preliminary findings indicate that this malware has been ‘in the 
wild’ for more than two years – since March 2010.”). But see Erdbrink, supra 
note 34 (suggesting that Flame is at least five years old). 
 40. Amy Teibel, Flame Virus: Suspicion Falls on Israel, IOL.COM (May 30, 
2012) http://www.iol.co.za/scitech/technology/security/flame–virus–suspicion–
falls–on–israel–1.1308148. 
 41. See Cyberattacks on Iran—Stuxnet and Flame, supra note 2; see also 
Kaspersky Lab, supra note 35 (“Although the features of Flame differ 
compared with those of previous notable cyber weapons such as Duqu and 
Stuxnet, the geography of attacks, use of specific software vulnerabilities, and 
the fact that only selected computers are being targeted all indicate that 
Flame belongs to the same category of super–cyberweapons.”). 
 42. Ellen Nakasima, Iran Acknowledges that Flame Virus has Infected 
Computers Nationwide, WASH. POST, May 29, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national–security/iran–acknowledges–
that–flame–virus–has–infected–computers–
nationwide/2012/05/29/gJQAzlEF0U_story.html. 
 43. Id. (noting that there were few instances of infected computers outside 
the Middle East, and that Kaspersky data is limited to infections reported by 
their customers). 
 44. Israel’s vice prime minister, Moshe Yaalon, drew attention with his 
comment that “[w]hoever sees the Iranian threat as a significant threat is 
likely to take various steps, including these, to hobble it . . . . Israel is blessed 
with high technology, and we boast tools that open all sorts of opportunities 
for us.” Tiebel, supra note 40. 
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Flame is part of the joint United States–Israeli operation that 
was launched prior to Stuxnet in order to secretly map Iran’s 
computer networks in preparation for the Stuxnet attacks.45   
How should these three different computer network 
operations be characterized? How should computer network 
operations be characterized more generally? Should computer 
network operations be considered a use of force or an armed 
attack under the U.N. Charter? When should computer 
network operations be considered a criminal offense? When 
should they be considered espionage? While analyzing each of 
these issues we will revisit the Estonian attack, the Stuxnet 
worm, and Flame in order to determine how these situations 
should be understood under international law. In order to 
understand how they are characterized we must first define 
what constitutes a computer network operation.  
 
III. WHAT ARE COMPUTER NETWORKS OPERATIONS? 
Computer network operations (CNOs) have been defined 
by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as being used to 
“attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend 
electronic information and infrastructure.”46 The term CNO 
will therefore be used in this Article to describe any type of 
online or computer intrusion or defense. In order to more 
narrowly describe each type of CNO for the purposes of this 
Article, cyber–attack will be used broadly to describe CNOs 
that include attacks which fall under the law of war and cyber–
crime attacks. The term cyber–crime will refer to any “crime 
which is enabled by, or that targets computers.”47 Cyber–
espionage will be used to describe computer operations which 
are used for intelligence and data collection from target or 
adversary computer systems.48  
Additionally there are three main categories of the 
 
 45. Ellen Nakashima et al., U.S., Israel Developed Flame Computer Virus 
to Slow Iranian Nuclear Efforts, Officials Say, WASH. POST, June 19, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national–security/us–israel–developed–
computer–virus–to–slow–iranian–nuclear–efforts–officials–
say/2012/06/19/gJQA6xBPoV_story.html; see supra part II.B (discussing the 
history of Stuxnet and the Olympic Games program).  
 46. CYBERCRIMES: A MULTIDICIPLINARY ANALYSIS 192-93 (Sumit Ghosh & 
Elliot Turrini, eds., 2010) (citing UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS, 3–13 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Feb. 13, 2006), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf). 
 47. WILSON, supra note 14, at 4.  
 48.  Id. at 12. 
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mechanism of CNOs: malicious software, unauthorized remote 
intrusions, and DoS attacks.49 Malicious software or malware 
usually infects computers through infected emails or websites 
modifying the programs to carry out functions that were not 
originally intended.50 Unauthorized remote intrusions occur 
when the attacker is able to access a computer through account 
names and/or passwords and is then able to disrupt the 
computer and data within.51 Third, DoS attacks overwhelm the 
targeted computer system with requests and information until 
it ceases to function, thereby denying access to legitimate 
users.52 Any of these CNOs may be specifically tailored for a 
particular purpose which further complicates the identification 
of which legal paradigm should apply to a particular CNO. 
 
IV. LEGAL PARADIGMS FOR COMPUTER NETWORK 
OPERATIONS 
A. THE U.N. CHARTER AND USE OF FORCE 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter sets forth the fundamental 
international law prohibition on the use of force, stating that, 
“all members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”53 There 
are two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force in 
Article 2(4). First, Articles 39 and 41 provide that the U.N. 
Security Council may take action by air, sea, or land forces to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.54 Second, 
Article 51 also authorizes use of force in self–defense, stating 
 
 49. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 13, at 442; Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving 
the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of 
Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. 
REV. 1, 13–14 (2009). Cf. LEHTINEN ET AL., COMPUTER SECURITY BASICS 79–
95, 112–33 (2d ed. 2006) (categorizing cyber–attacks in two groups: viruses 
and Internet vulnerabilities); ANDREW COLARIK, CYBER TERRORISM, POLITICAL 
AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 84 (2006) (categorizing cyber–attacks into 4 
groups: viruses, denial–of–service attacks, web defacements, and unauthorized 
penetration). 
 50. See Sklerov, supra note 49, at 15–17 (explaining the range of 
malicious software, including viruses, worms, Trojan horses, rootkits, exploits, 
and zombies). 
 51. Id. at 17. 
 52. Id. at 16–17; see also id. at 16 (describing DDoS attacks, which launch 
coordinated attacks from multiple computers).  
 53. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 54. U.N. Charter art. 39, 41. 
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that, “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self–defense if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”55 Under these 
fundamental provisions no nation may use force against 
another nation unless it is authorized by the U.N. Security 
Council or is in self–defense against an armed attack.  
These U.N. Charter provisions can be applied to cyber–
attacks. There has been an international consensus among 
scholars and the U.N. that cyber–attacks may be understood 
under the U.N. Charter even though such an attack is not 
explicitly mentioned in the Charter.56 Articles 2(4), 39, 42, and 
51 do not list or refer to any specific weapons but the 
International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on nuclear 
weapons found that these provisions “apply to any use of force, 
regardless of the weapons employed. The Charter neither 
expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific 
weapon . . . .”57 The court went on to hold that the rules of war 
under the U.N. Charter apply even as new weapons are 
introduced that were not originally considered or even 
imagined by the drafters of the Charter.58 In May 2011, the 
United States Department of Defense concluded in its first 
formal cyber–strategy that the laws of armed conflict can be 
expanded to include cyber–warfare thereby allowing the 
application of both Article 2(4) and Article 51 to cyber–
attacks.59 While there is a consensus that the U.N. Charter 
provisions may be applied to cyber–attacks, the more complex 
question is under what circumstances should the provisions be 
applied, and which article will be applied. Under the U.N. 
Charter conflicts are generally divided into Article 2(4) conflicts 
which involve a violation of the use of force prohibition, Articles 
39 and 42 conflicts when the Security Council authorizes use of 
force, and Article 51 conflicts which authorize nations to act in 
 
 55. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 56. Stephanie Gosnell Handler, The New Cyber Face of Battle: Developing 
a Legal Approach to Accommodate Emerging Trends in Warfare, 48 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 209, 216–19 (2012). 
 57. Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 22, ¶ 39 (July 8). 
 58. Id. at 35, ¶ 78; Handler, supra note 56, at 217. 
 59. See Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, 
WALL ST. J., May 30, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023045631045763556231357827
18.html; Ed Pilkington, Washington Moves to Classify Cyber–Attacks as Acts of 
War: US Sees Option of Armed Retaliation as Deterrent Concern over Practical 
and Legal Implications, GUARDIAN, June 1, 2011, at 2. 
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self–defense to an armed attack.60  
 
1. Prohibition on the Use of Force: Article 2(4) 
The drafters of the U.N. Charter intended to prohibit all 
types of force, except when done in self–defense or as 
authorized by the U.N. Security Council.61 The Security 
Council was intended to be the primary body for determining 
when force should be used. It was also to have its own military 
force which could use force when needed to maintain 
international peace and security.62  
What constitutes a threat of force under Article 2(4) is still 
relatively vague, but Professor Wingfield testified to the 
National Research Council’s report drafting committee that 
some threats that might constitute “threats of force” under 
Article 2(4) include “verbal threats, initial troop movements, 
initial movements of ballistic missiles, massing of troops on a 
border, use of fire control radars, and interference with early 
warning or command and control systems.”63 Cyber–attacks 
will be compared to the items on this non–exhaustive list to 
determine whether they constitute a threat of force. 
Today, there is no clear definition of what constitutes use 
of force.64 The U.N. Charter does not define use of force, nor has 
any international body.65 Some scholars have argued that 
giving the term “use of force” a definite meaning is an 
impossible task; the term is imprecise.66 This imprecise 
 
 60. Scott J. Shackelford & Richard B. Andres, State Responsibility for 
Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 971, 995–96 (Summer 2011). 
 61. Jason Barkham, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 57, 69 (2001); see RUTH B. 
RUSSELL, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 456–57, 673–75, 1067 
(1958) (covering the intentions of key drafters of the U.N. Charter).  
 62. Andrew Miller, Note, Universal Soldiers: U.N. Standing Armies and 
the Legal Alternatives, 81 GEO. L.J. 773, 779–83 (1993); see Barkham, supra 
note 61, at 69. 
 63. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS, TECHNOLOGY, 
POLICY, LAW AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF 
CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 242 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009).  
 64. For a discussion the history and progression of the legal 
understanding of the “use of force” see James N. Bond, Peacetime Foreign 
Data Manipulation as One Aspect of Offensive Information Warfare: 
Questions of Legality Under the United Nations Charter Article 2(4) 48–80 
(June 14, 1996) (unpublished M.A. final report, Naval War College) (available 
at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/nwc_bond.pdf). 
 65. Id. at 50–51. 
 66. Id. at 51 (“I suffer from no delusions about giving this phrase [use of 
force] precise meaning either. It is an impossible task.”).  
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meaning makes it difficult to determine if or when a cyber–
attack should be considered “force.” 
Fortunately, there are some parameters to help identify 
use of force despite the lack of a precise definition. Attacks 
which utilize conventional weapons are considered to be the use 
of force under the U.N. Charter.67 Attacks which cause damage 
to physical or real property or injury or death to humans are 
also considered to involve the use of force. The International 
Court of Justice also established in the case of Nicaragua v. 
United States of America that arming and training a rebel 
group constituted a use of force, but supplying of funds to a 
rebel group and United States military maneuvers held near 
the border did not involve the threat or use of force.68 The court 
also found that the laying of mines by the United States in the 
territorial waters of Nicaragua constituted a use of force, but 
that use of force did not rise to the level of an armed attack.69 
Furthermore, international law has established that economic 
and political coercion are expressly excluded from the definition 
of the use of force, despite the attempts of developing states to 
include them.70 Therefore, most scholars have determined that 
 
 67. Id. at 58; see Barkham, supra note 61, at 72. 
 68. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 227–38 (June 27) (determining that although these 
actions did not constitute a use of force under the U.N. Charter, it was an act 
of intervention); see Barkham, supra note 61, at 75. 
 69. Id. In 1949, the International Court of Justice found that Albania had 
“used force” against Britain. The British Royal Navy had swept the North 
Corfu Channel for mines to ensure that it was a safe route for navigation. On 
May 15, 1949, an Albanian gun battery fired at two British warships passing 
through the channel. The International Court of Justice determined that the 
firing at British ships constituted a use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of 
the U.N. Charter. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 12–14, 19, 27, 
34–37 (Apr. 9) (Merits). 
 70. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in 
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 908 (1999); see Janie Chuang, The United States as A 
Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 459–60 (2006) (arguing that Article 2(4) does not bar 
economic intervention or non–forcible intervention); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (AIV) & ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ISSUES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (CAVV), CYBER WARFARE 20 (2011) (hereinafter 
Advisory Council) (“Purely economic, diplomatic and political pressure or 
coercion is not defined as use of force under article 2, paragraph 4.”). There is 
a minority viewpoint that economic force or political coercion should be 
considered force under Article 2(4). Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, G.A. Res. 3281(XXIX), U.N Doc. A/RES/29/3281, art. 32 (Dec. 12, 1974) 
(prohibiting states from using economic sanctions to subordinate a state’s 
sovereign rights); Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in 
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economic force and political coercion do not constitute use of 
force under Article 2(4) while armed force does. 
Scholars have proposed two primary approaches to 
determine when armed force has been used in violation of 
Article 2(4). Michael Schmitt has proposed a seven factor test 
in order to determine when state action constitutes armed 
force, prohibited under Article 2(4), and when it constitutes 
economic force or political coercion, and must be approached 
outside of the use of force limit of Article 2(4).71 Schmitt’s seven 
factor test includes: severity, immediacy, directness, 
invasiveness, measurability, presumptive legitimacy, and 
responsibility.72 #1 Severity: When actions involve harm to 
individuals and property that alone will amount to use of force, 
while those that result in minor inconvenience or irritation will 
not.73 Within this framework CNOs that impact critical 
national interests are more likely to constitute a use of force 
and the scale, scope, and duration of the effects will be 
considered when determining the severity of the attack.74 #2 
Immediacy: How quickly the effects occur after the CNO. #3 
Directness: The greater connection between the attack and the 
effect the more likely it can be considered a use of force.75 #4 
Invasiveness: The more securely defended the system that is 
attacked the more likely it will be considered a use of force.76 #5 
Measurability: The more the impact of the CNO can be 
identified and quantified the more likely the state’s interest is 
to be viewed as affected.77 #6 Presumptive Legitimacy: If the 
activity has not been banned, then it is permitted.78 #7 
Responsibility: A state must be held responsible in order for the 
actions to be deemed a use of force.79 Through this approach a 
CNO operation can be analyzed to determine if the CNO 
reaches the level of use of force or whether they are better 
 
Legality Under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. 
REV. 983, 988 (1974) (“This Comment will argue for a broad interpretation of 
the word ‘force’ in Article 2(4)—in particular, its extension to include political 
and economic coercion.”).  
 71. Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum 
Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569, 576–77 (2011). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 576. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 576–77. 
 78. Id. at 577. 
 79. Id. 
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placed outside the use of force boundary.80 However, this test is 
not universally followed. Schmitt’s analysis has been criticized 
by some scholars as being too subjective and needing too much 
information to be practically applied.81  
The second proposed approach to determine when an 
activity qualifies as a use of force is to establish a broad, 
result–oriented analysis which looks at the impact of the 
actions, or the severity of the action, to see whether it 
constitutes a use of force.82 According to Schmitt analyzing only 
the result of the attack, or the severity of consequences of the 
attack, is not sufficient to preserve the distinction between 
armed force and economic and political coercion; instead of 
being a mere interpretation of Article 2(4), it would constitute a 
new standard.83 Under the result–oriented approach some 
economic force would be considered armed force due to its 
impact.84 The results–oriented approach therefore conflicts 
with the current interpretation that use of force does not 
include economic force.85 
 
2. Use of Force Authorized by the Security Council: 
Articles 39 and 42 
The Security Council is authorized to use force when its 
members have determined under Article 39 that there has been 
a threat to the international peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression.86 Every threat or use of force under Article 2(4) is 
considered to be a breach of the peace under Article 39 of the 
U.N. Charter and the Security Council is therefore authorized 
to use force for any violation of Article 2(4).87 The Security 
Council’s power to authorize force extends beyond a state’s 
violation of Article 2(4) and the Security Council may authorize 
force at a threshold that is considerably lower than Article 
2(4).88 Determining that there is a threat to the peace is a 
 
 80. See Matthew Hoisington, Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving 
Rise to the Right of Self Defense, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 439, 448 
(2009). 
 81. Barkham, supra note 61, at 85–87; Handler, supra note 56, at 229. 
 82. Schmitt supra note 62 at 917. 
 83. Id. at 917–19. 
 84. Barkham, supra note 61, at 86. 
 85. Id. 
 86. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42. 
 87. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 119 (Bruno 
Simma ed., 1994). 
 88. Id.  
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political decision, not a legal decision.89 There are no territorial 
limits, requirement that a threat be a state action, or that 
violence needs to occur for the Security Council to determine 
that there is a threat to the peace.90 Once the Security Council 
has made a threat to the peace determination, there is no 
mechanism for reviewing this decision; the Council’s 
determination is final.91 Scholars have concluded, based on 
Security Council decisions, that threats to the peace include 
but are not limited to extreme intrastate violence, severe 
human rights violations, apartheid, and cross–frontier 
expulsion of a large number of refugees.92 
While the Security Council has full capacity to authorize 
the use of force when there is a threat to international peace, 
Article 39 determinations and recommendations to use force by 
the Security Council are difficult to achieve and are therefore 
rare.93 The Security Council has the full authority to label any 
CNO a threat to the peace, but they are unlikely to do so.94 
Decisions to use force under Articles 39 and 42 are determined 
after extensive debates and deliberations, and during voting 
any decision to use force may be blocked through a veto made 
by any of the permanent members of the Security Council.95 “In 
light of Russia’s and China’s presence on the Council (cyber 
operations regularly emanate from their territory), this 
limitation may well prove the greatest obstacle to effective U.N. 
action in the face of those cyber operations which would in 
some fashion endanger international stability.”96 Due to the 
extensive deliberations and permanent member veto it is 
 
 89. Schmitt, supra note 71, at 584. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE ix 
(Aegis Research Corporation 1999) at 150, 
http://www.cse.msstate.edu/~cse6243/readings/CyberSpace%20and%20the%20
Use%20of%20Force%20–%20Sharp1999.pdf. 
 93. David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 87, 88–89 (2010). The Security Council’s activism has 
varied over time. During the Cold War (1949–1987) the Security Council 
established only thirteen peacekeeping operations. During the ten year period 
between 1988 and 1998 the Security Council sent 36 peacekeeping missions. 
Since this large increase following the end of the Cold War Security Council 
activism has leveled off and has not shown any large increases or decreases. 
DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND 
PROCESS 15 (4th ed. 2009).  
 94. Schmitt, supra note 71, at 584. 
 95. U.N. Charter, art. 27; Graham, supra note 93, at 89. 
 96. Schmitt, supra note 71, at 586. 
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unlikely that the Security Council would respond in a timely 
manner or even respond at all to a cyber–attack. Therefore, it is 
more likely for states to respond to cyber–attacks in self–
defense without Security Council authorization.97 
 
3. Armed Attack: Article 51 
Article 51 permits the use of force in self–defense against 
an armed attack.98 If the action does not rise to the level of an 
armed attack, states have no right to respond with force. If the 
action does not reach the threshold of an armed attack, then 
the victim state may only respond with non–forceful actions, 
countermeasures,99 and seek recourse from the Security 
Council. The distinction between what constitutes a use of force 
and what amounts to an armed attack is important because an 
armed attack allows a victimized nation to respond with 
force.100 According to the International Court of Justice in 
Nicaragua v. United States of America, an armed attack must 
exhibit certain “scale and effects.”101 Unfortunately, the court 
did not go on to determine the required criteria for when an 
attack reaches this threshold. Scholars have determined that 
with the contemporary methods of warfare an attack should be 
measured qualitatively and not quantitatively, so the 
determination is not dependent on the numbers affected by the 
attack but instead the overall scope of the attack.102 Scholars 
have suggested several approaches to determining when an 
attack reaches the level of an armed attack, the 
 
 97. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 13, at 511 (“Because of the complicated 
nature of gaining Security Council approval for a use of force, some argue that 
it is more likely that a state would use self–defense to respond to a 
cyberattack in lieu of seeking Security Council approval.”). 
 98. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 99. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in Rep. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 53d sess, Apr. 23–June 1 & July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, art. 49 cmt. 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pd
f (“Countermeasures may only be taken by an injured State in order to induce 
the responsible State to comply with its obligations under Part Two, namely, 
to cease the internationally wrongful conduct, if it is continuing, and to 
provide reparation to the injured State. Countermeasures are not intended as 
a form of punishment for wrongful conduct, but as an instrument for achieving 
compliance with the obligations of the responsible State under Part Two.”). 
 100. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 101. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27) (Judgment). 
 102. See Schmitt, supra note 71, at 589. 
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instrumentality–based approach, the target–based approach 
and the consequence–based approach. The consequence–based 
approach has emerged as the dominant method for determining 
when the “scale and effects” have reached the required level to 
be considered an armed attack.  
The first approach, which drafters of the U.N. Charter 
originally intended to be used, is to analyze the instrumentality 
that is used in the attack.103 This approach focuses on what 
type of force the state is using. Since traditional instruments of 
force have been defined by their physical characteristics, such 
as a bomb, tank, or missile, this approach was originally 
appropriate.104 Today, this approach is not applicable to cyber–
attacks because they do not conform to the required physical 
characteristics. Cyber–attacks are conducted entirely through 
cyber–space and therefore lack the requirement of being a 
traditional military instrument.105  
The second approach is known as the target–based 
approach and focuses on the intended target of the attack.106 
The target–based approach is simple to apply because if the 
attack is aimed at critical national infrastructure, it is 
considered to be an armed attack no matter what the actual 
damage is.107 Allowing a use of force in response to a CNO 
which only meets the requirement of being aimed at critical 
national infrastructure would allow an expansion of the ability 
to use force in a manner not intended by the drafters of the 
U.N. Charter. 
The third approach, which has the most support, is the 
consequence–based approach or equivalent–effects test. The 
consequence–based approach focuses not on what approach the 
country used but instead on the end result or the effect of the 
particular approach.108 “Applying the consequence–based 
approach, armed attack must also be understood in terms of 
 
 103. Wolfgang McGavran, Intended Consequences: Regulating Cyber 
Attacks, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 259, 269–70 (2009). 
 104. Handler, supra note 56, at 227. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 228–29. 
 107. Id. Critical national infrastructure includes: government, information 
and communications, banking, food, water, public health, emergency services, 
defense industrial base, energy, transportation, chemical industry and 
hazardous materials, and posting and shipping. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., NAT’L INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN 103 (2009). 
 108. Handler, supra note 56, at 228–29. 
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the effects typically associated with the term ‘armed.’”109 An 
attack is considered to be “armed” if it results in the death or 
injury to people or destruction of property and other tangible 
objects.110 Under this approach the consequences of an attack, 
such as a cyber–attack, need to be analogous to the effects of a 
classic military operation.111 Scholars emphasize different 
aspects of the attack including severity or destructive effects 
and immediacy to determine whether it rises to the level of a 
classic military operation, but under this approach the focus is 
on the consequences of the attack.112 Cyber–space operations 
may by themselves constitute an armed attack, such as when a 
cyber–attack destroys its target.113 CNOs may also support 
traditional military operations, aiding the fighters by 
disrupting enemy defenses thereby allowing forces to destroy 
the target without having to physically destroy their defense 
system.114 Since the traditional military attack will generally 
constitute an armed attack, it is usually unnecessary to 
determine whether the cyber–attack would also be considered 
an armed attack thereby activating the right to self–defense. 
Since the consequence–based method is supported by most 
scholars to determine the requisite “scale and effects” to 
constitute an armed attack the situations discussed further in 
this article will be analyzed using this method. 
Under Article 51, a classic military armed attack activates 
the target nation’s right to respond in self–defense.115 A nation 
responding to an armed attack must fulfill the requirements of 
necessity, proportionality, and immediacy. The principle of 
necessity requires that “non–forcible remedies must either 
prove futile in limine or have in fact been exhausted in an 
unsatisfactory manner.”116 The attack must be traced back to a 
 
 109. Michael N. Schmitt, supra note 71, at 588. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  
 112. See Stephanie Gosnell Handler, supra note 56, at 228–29. 
 113. Id. at 216. 
 114. See Id. 
 115. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 116. Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self–Defense, in 
COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 99, 109 (Michael N. 
Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., Naval War College 2002); see Graham H. 
Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an 
Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F. L. REV. 65, 98 (2009) (“Necessity involves 
whether effective peaceful means of resolution exist[,] the nature of the 
aggression, each party’s objectives, and the likelihood of effective intervention 
by the international community.”). 
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specific source, the targeted nation must uncover the intention 
behind the attack to ensure that it was not an accident, and 
come to the conclusion that the state needs to respond with 
force.117 Proportionality requires that the response should 
reflect a modicum of symmetry between the response and the 
original attack, and should only use the amount of force needed 
to stop an ongoing attack or future attacks.118 Immediacy 
requires that the defensive action not be too tardy.119 This 
condition is read broadly and responsive action may sometimes 
be taken days, weeks, or even months after the original 
attack.120  
An additional consideration is whether anticipatory self–
defense is permitted under the U.N. Charter. Anticipatory self–
defense occurs when a nation acts in self–defense before it is 
the victim of an actual armed attack.121 Scholars disagree as to 
whether Article 51 permits anticipatory self–defense.122 Some 
scholars believe that Article 51 limits self–defense until after 
an armed attack occurs.123 But in analyzing claims of self–
defense, governments and scholars have often invoked the 
Caroline Criteria, which were developed by the United States 
Secretary of Defense Daniel Webster in 1837.124 Under this 
framework, anticipatory self–defense is lawful when there is a 
necessity of self–defense that is instant, overwhelming, leaves 
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.125 In 
addition, the response cannot be unreasonable or excessive.126 
The Caroline Criteria have been viewed as customary 
international law in applying anticipatory self–defense under 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.127 State practice, however, 
following the adoption of the U.N. Charter does not provide a 
clear conclusion as to whether acting in anticipatory self–
 
 117. Dinstein, supra note 116. 
 118. Id.; David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 87, 89 (2010).  
 119. Dinstein, supra note 116, at 110. 
 120. Id. 
 121. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, 
PROCESS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH, 862 (3rd ed. 2010). 
 122. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 13, at 528. 
 123. Id. 
 124. JEFFREY DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 121, at 851, 863. 
 125. Id. at 851. 
 126. Id. 
 127. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (AIV) & ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON ISSUES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (CAVV), PRE–EMPTIVE 
ACTION 16 (July 2004) (Neth.). 
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defense is permitted.128 
 
B. CYBER–CRIME 
What is a cyber–crime? Law enforcement experts, 
commentators, and scholars disagree.129 Some view cyber–
crimes as ordinary crimes that are simply committed using a 
high tech computer.130 They assert that these crimes should 
therefore be prosecuted under the traditional laws, such as 
trespass, larceny, and conspiracy.131 Others view cyber–crimes 
as a new category of crime with unique challenges not present 
by traditional crimes, such as issues regarding jurisdiction, 
international cooperation, intent, and offender identification.132 
Different states have their own criminal codes which define 
what cyber–activities constitute crimes. The United States has 
codified a wide range of cyber–operations which constitute 
crimes, including substantive cyber–crime laws133 and 
procedural cyber–crime laws.134 In contrast to the United 
 
 128. Id. at 18–20. See generally Id. at 17–18 (detailing specific situations of 
state action and anticipatory self–defense after the adoption of the U.N. 
Charter). 
 129. Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber–Crimes: A Practical 
Approach to the Application of Federal Computer Crime Law, 16 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 180 (2000). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. At this point in time Congress has approached computer crime as 
both traditional and new. Congress has amended the Securities Act of 1933 to 
include crimes committed by a computer, but they have also enacted a new 
computer fraud and abuse section that can be amended as technology and 
computer crimes evolve. Id.  
 133. Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Dep’t J., 
Cybercrime Laws of the United States (compiled by Al Rees, CCIPS), OAS, 1 
(Oct. 2006), http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/us_cyb_laws.pdf. Substantive 
cyber–crime laws are laws which prohibit online identity theft, hacking, 
intrusion into computer systems, child pornography, intellectual property, and 
online gambling. Id. One example is the United States Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act “which has been used civilly and criminally, in situations where an 
employer asserts that one has abused a workplace computer to violate the 
employer’s competitively–sensitive, confidential and proprietary information, 
stored on or accessible through computers.” The Act also prohibits hacking 
into computers to obtain information that has been determined to require 
protection from unauthorized disclosures for reasons of national defense or 
foreign relations, or any data restricted by Section 11 of Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, and unauthorized access to computers of a federal department or 
agency. Leslie J. Hagin, Workplace Cyber Crimes, 6TH ANNUAL LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW CONFERENCE 1, 5 (Nov. 2, 2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (West). 
 134. Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Dep’t J., 
Cybercrime Laws of the United States (compiled by Al Rees, CCIPS), OAS, 1 
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States’ large number of cyber–crime laws, there are many 
nations which have either ineffective cyber–crime laws or have 
not amended their laws to include cyber–crimes at all.135 
“As a result of rapid adoption of the Internet globally, 
computer crimes include not only hacking and cracking, but 
now also include extortion, child pornography, money 
laundering, fraud, software pirating, and corporate espionage, 
to name a few.”136 One identification issue is the distinction 
between hackers and crackers, which creates considerable 
problems for categorization. Hackers are people who access 
computer systems in order to gain knowledge about how the 
system itself works.137 They like to tinker with computer 
systems simply for the enjoyment of doing so and do not intend 
to do damage to them.138 Crackers hack the computer system 
and then attempt to do damage; they steal information and 
cause disruption for either personal, political, or strategic 
reasons.139  
The cyber–crime model is currently based in domestic law, 
but the application of jurisdiction creates several problems 
when applied to cyber–crimes.140 One of the most common 
 
(October 2006), http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/us_cyb_laws.pdf. 
Procedural cyber–crime laws involve the authority to preserve and obtain 
electronic data from third parties, authority to intercept electronic 
communications and search and seize electronic evidence. Id. For additional 
information on cybercrime laws in the United States and internationally, see 
SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERCRIME: CRIMINAL THREATS FROM CYBERSPACE 
(2010); JONATHAN CLOUGH, PRINCIPLES OF CYBERCRIME (2010). 
 135. See Nancy E. Marion, The Council of Europe’s Cyber Crime Treaty: An 
Exercise in Symbolic Legislation, 4 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 699, 700 
(2010); Cyber Crime . . . and Punishment? Archaic Laws Threaten Global 
Information, MCCONNELL INTERNATIONAL, 3–4 (Dec. 2000), 
http://www.witsa.org/papers/McConnell–cybercrime.pdf. For additional 
information on international cybercrime laws and the views and practices in 
various jurisdictions, see CYBERCRIME AND JURISDICTION (Bert–Jaap Koops & 
Susan W. Brenner et al. eds., 2006). For information on each nation’s current 
cyber–laws, see J. Stein Scholberg, Cybercrime Law, CYBERCRIMELAW (Feb. 
22, 2013, 12:56 AM), http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/Cybercrimelaws.html.  
 136. Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 129, at 178–79. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Chad Perrin, Hacker v. Cracker, TECHREPUBLIC IT SECURITY BLOG 
(Apr. 17, 2009, 1:20 PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/security/hacker–
vs–cracker/1400. Damage does sometimes occur but it is their lack of intent to 
do damage that helps to distinguish them from crackers. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 
1030 (West Supp. 1999). 
 139. Perrin, supra note 138. Some crackers also try to do good things after 
penetrating computer systems, such as providing penetration testing services, 
but most have a malicious intent. Id. 
 140. Cf. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY (Mark F. Grady & 
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jurisdictional claims for traditional crimes is the location of the 
crime, but identifying the location of a cyber–crime raises 
numerous questions.141 Is the source of the electronic 
communication the location?142 Where it was originally 
received?143 What if criminal conduct in furtherance of the 
offense occurred in the jurisdiction?144 Or did the offender 
simply access a computer in that state?145 It can also be very 
difficult to tell where the criminal act actually takes place. 
Material may be uploaded in one state or several states, while 
the hosting provided may be in another state, or publication 
may occur in every place where the material can be received 
and viewed.146 In addition, jurisdictional claims may be based 
on the location of the computers, persons, effects, or the 
nationality of the perpetrator or the victims.147 Each state may 
have its own jurisdictional framework for the prosecution of 
cyber–crimes.148 
While cyber–crimes are currently being prosecuted within 
domestic law, there have been proposals for the establishment 
of an International Criminal Tribunal for Cyberspace 
(ICTC).149 The jurisdiction of the ICTC would be limited to the 
 
Francesco Parisi eds., 2007) (arguing that the issues related to cyber–security 
are primarily the result of computer owners purchasing less than optimal 
security levels and that the “problem is compounded because the insecure 
networks extend far beyond the regulatory jurisdiction of any one nation or 
even coalition of nations.”). 
 141. Susan W. Brenner & Bert–Jaap Koops, Approaches to Cybercrime 
Jurisdiction, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L.1, 10 (2004).  
 142. See id. at 10–16.  
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id.  
 146. Id. at 15.  
 147. See id. at 10–21. For a restricted number of crimes countries may also 
claim universal jurisdiction. This claim of jurisdiction is for particularly 
heinous crimes condemned by the international community. This is a claim of 
jurisdiction regardless of the location of the act, the nationality of the 
perpetrator or victim, or any protected interest of the country. Germany and 
Belgium do currently claim universal jurisdiction for one particular cyber–
crime: child pornography. The United States currently does not recognize 
universal jurisdiction for any cyber–crimes and only asserts this claim for a 
few crimes including piracy, hostage–taking, aircraft hijacking, aircraft 
sabotage, and torture. Brenner & Koops, supra note 141, at 28. 
 148. See Brenner & Koops, supra note 141, at 3–26. 
 149. J. Stein Schjolberg, Recommendation for Potential New Global Legal 
Mechanisms Against Global Cyberattacks and Other Global Cybercrimes: An 
International Criminal Tribunal for Cyberspace (ICTC) CYBERCRIMELAW (Feb. 
22, 2013, 1:45 AM), http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/documents/ICTC.pdf. 
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cyber–crimes of most serious concern to the international 
community, including violations of a global treaty or set of 
treaties on cyber–crime, or coordinated global cyber–attacks 
against critical national infrastructure.150  
It has also been suggested that the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) may have jurisdiction over certain cyber–crimes. 
At the Kampala Conference in 2010, the states that are parties 
to the ICC treaty agreed upon the definition of the crime of 
aggression: “[T]he planning, preparation, initiation or 
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
state, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”151 Under this definition, in order to effectively 
prosecute a cyber–attack under the crime of aggression, the 
prosecution must establish that there was a state action, which 
rose to the level of use of armed force, and the prosecution must 
establish jurisdiction over the crime.152 While the definition of 
aggression did not explicitly include cyber–attacks and seems 
to be limited to traditional armed attacks by state actors, it 
could be argued that certain cyber–attacks could be considered 
crimes of aggression.153 While ICC jurisdiction over cyber–
crimes appears to be a possibility it is a few years off, the 
earliest that the ICC could have jurisdiction over crimes of 
aggression is January 1, 2017.154 
 
Schjolberg has proposed several different locations for where the court may be 
located: 1. Additional provisions or articles may be included in the list under 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. 2. Establish a special 
International Criminal Court for Cyberspace (ICTC) as a subdivision of the 
ICC in The Hague. 3. Create the ICTC through a United Nations Security 
Council decision. 4. Base the ICTC in Singapore in conjunction with the 
establishment of the Interpol Global Complex (IGC). Id. at 15–16. 
 150. Id. at 18. 
 151. Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Assembly of State Parties, Review 
Conference, the Crime of Aggression, ICC Doc. RC/Res. 6 (June 11, 2010).  
 152. Chance Cammack, The Stuxnet Worm and Potential Prosecution By 
the International Criminal Court Under the Newly Defined Crime of 
Aggression, 20 TUL. J. INT’L COMP. L. 303, 319 (2011). 
 153. Id. at 320. Cammack argues that under certain situations and a broad 
interpretation the Stuxnet worm and others could be considered a crime of 
aggression. Id. 
 154. Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 151; “2. The Court may exercise 
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression committed one year after 
the ratification or acceptance by thirty States Parties. 3. The Court may 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with this 
article, subjection to a decision taken after 1 January 2017 by the same 
majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment to 
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Under the current model what constitutes a cyber–crime is 
defined by each state individually. The current international 
model for prosecuting cyber–criminals is the same as 
prosecuting traditional criminals. If a person violates the law of 
a state, they may be prosecuted within that state. If the 
perpetrator committed the crime in one state but is located in 
another state, the victimized nation may ask to have the 
perpetrator extradited. “‘Extradition’ is the formal surrender of 
a person by a State to another State for prosecution or 
punishment.”155 Extradition is regulated by treaties between 
nations. Although the United States has treaties with over 100 
countries, there remain many countries with which it does not 
have an extradition treaty.156 When an individual has 
committed a crime in one country but is located in another 
country, the nation wishing to prosecute the offender may 
submit a request through diplomatic channels to have the 
offender released to the victim nation for prosecution.157 
Extradition also requires dual criminality, which requires that 
a person may be extradited only when their actions are 
criminal in both the state requesting their extradition and the 
requested state.158 The varieties of cyber–crime activity, along 
with some countries’ lack of legislation prohibiting cyber–
crimes, make it difficult for many cyber–crimes to meet the 
dual criminality requirement.159  
 
C. CYBER–ESPIONAGE 
“Cyber–espionage is defined as the intentional use of 
 
the Statute.” Id. at art. 15, ¶¶ 2–3. Delivering on the Promise of a Fair, 
Effective, and Independent Court: The Crime of Aggression, ICCNOW, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (last visited June 15, 2012). 
 155. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
7–5700, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF THE 
LAW AND RECENT TREATIES 1 (2010). 
 156. Id. at summary. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on 
Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 10 INT’L J.L. & INFO TECH. 139, 141 (2002). 
 159. Id. at 223. The Love Bug virus is a good example of how the dual 
criminality requirement can be a roadblock to effective prosecution of cyber–
crimes. The Love Bug destroyed files and stole passwords affecting forty–five 
million users in more than twenty countries, causing somewhere between $2 
billion and $10 billion in damage. Onel de Gusman created and disseminated 
the Love Bug and lived in the Philippines. Since Philippine law did not 
criminalize hacking and the distribution of viruses, Guzman could not be 
prosecuted in the Philippines or be extradited for prosecution in other 
countries which have cyber–crime laws. Id. at 139–40. 
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computers or digital communications activities in an effort to 
gain access to sensitive information about an adversary or 
competitor for the purpose of gaining an advantage or selling 
the sensitive information for monetary reward.”160 Espionage 
does not reach the level of use of force under the U.N. 
Charter.161 Espionage is used by nations at the risk that if their 
spies are apprehended in a foreign jurisdiction they may be 
prosecuted criminally. In order for spies to be prosecuted they 
must be apprehended in the foreign jurisdiction, since a state is 
not likely to extradite their own spies to be prosecuted abroad. 
“The law of espionage is, therefore, unique in that it consists of 
a norm (territorial integrity), the violation of which may be 
punished by offended states, but states have persistently 
violated the norm . . . .”162  
Just as traditional spies may be prosecuted if apprehended 
in a foreign territory, computer experts who conduct cyber–
espionage may also be prosecuted if apprehended in a foreign 
jurisdiction. However, the opportunity for cyber–spies to be 
arrested is reduced compared to traditional spying because 
cyber–espionage can usually be conducted from within the 
home country. This reduced opportunity for prosecution does 
not alter the reality that cyber–espionage is merely another 
form of espionage. Therefore, the current domestic and 
international laws for traditional espionage can and should be 
applied to cyber–espionage.  
Some argue that cyber–espionage needs to be treated more 
severely than traditional espionage, because cyber–espionage is 
more intrusive than traditional espionage, due to the capacity 
to repeatedly take huge amounts of data, and because non–
state actors have the ability to effectuate an attack.163 Scholars 
 
 160. Kevin G. Coleman, Cyber Espionage Targets Sensitive Data, SIP 
TRUNKING (Dec. 29, 2008), http://sip–
trunking.tmcnet.com/topics/security/articles/47927–cyber–espionage–targets–
sensitive–data.htm. 
 161. Anna Wortham, Should Cyber Exploitation Ever Constitute a 
Demonstration of Hostile Intent That May Violate UN Charter Provisions 
Prohibiting the Threat or Use of Force?, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 643, 655 (2012). 
 162. Commander Roger D. Scott, Note, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence 
Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 218 (1999). 
 163. See Wartham, supra note 161, at 658; see also Shackelford & Andres, 
supra note 60, at 979 (“Stephen Chabinsky, a senior FBI official responsible 
for cyber security. . . ‘A spy might once have been able to take out a few books’ 
worth of material, now they take the whole library. And if you restock the 
shelves, they will steal it again.’”). Melinzsky asserts that the severity of 
cyber–espionage along with the scale of the theft and lack of risk warrants 
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who support this proposition propose that cyber–espionage 
should, in some situations, be treated as a use of force or threat 
of use of force under the U.N. Charter.164 In contrast, others 
propose that due to the new and unique nature of cyber–
espionage, a new set of laws need to be developed.165 However, 
it is the minority opinion that calls for treating cyber–
espionage differently from traditional espionage. The majority 
of scholars and nations approach cyber–espionage in the same 
way as traditional espionage. 
The test to determine what constitutes cyber–espionage is 
simple. If the CNO is only collecting information, then it is 
cyber–espionage. If the CNO is doing more than merely 
collecting information, then it is considered to be more than 
espionage and may rise to the level of use of force or an armed 
attack. While the test is simple, it is often difficult to determine 
from the computer code alone whether a CNO’s objective is 
merely the collection of information, or something more 
malicious, since both can use similar technology.166  
 
V. APPLICATION OF LEGAL PARADIGMS TO SITUATIONS 
A. ESTONIA 
The CNOs against Estonia in 2007 present a unique 
opportunity to analyze whether the disabling of their 
government websites could be considered a use of force under 
the U.N. Charter, an armed attack, or a crime.  
Michael Schmitt determined that although the attacks 
against Estonia caused no deaths or physical injury, the CNOs 
 
military action. “The severity of the problem of data theft is too great and its 
effects too harmful.” “The scale of thefts is unprecedented: ‘Every year, an 
amount of intellectual property many times larger than all the intellectual 
property contained in the Library of Congress is stolen from networks 
maintained by U.S. businesses, universities, and government agencies.’” In 
order to steal that much information a spy would have needed a forklift and a 
van and would have a high level of risk including the risk of getting caught or 
killed. Alexander Melnitzky, Note, Defending America Against Cyber 
Espionage Through the Use of Active Defenses, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L AND COMP. 
L. 537, 566 (2012). 
 164. Alexander Melnitzky, supra note 163, at 564–65 (arguing that cyber–
espionage may amount to an armed attack under an effects–based approach 
because it is the potential for an armed attack that makes the activity an 
armed attack and cyber–espionage has that potential). 
 165. Wartham, supra note 161, at 657. (“The capabilities of cyber 
technology simply differ too much from those of traditional espionage, and the 
ease with which the technologies for cyber–exploitation and cyber–attack can 
be used together demands a new set of laws.”).  
 166. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 13, at 426. 
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affected the overall operation of Estonian society and was, 
therefore, a use of force.167 Under the seven–factor test Schmitt 
determined that the effects of the attack were immediate and 
also long–lasting.168 The effects were direct since the DoS 
attacks promptly resulted in an inability to access funds, 
government websites, and news sources.169 The attacks were 
also invasive since they targeted websites and computer 
systems that were protected and secured.170 Schmitt 
determined that if Russia had been responsible for the CNO, 
then it would be considered a cyber–attack and in violation of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.171 Under the result–oriented 
approach it is most likely that the CNO would be considered a 
violation of Article 2(4) because the CNO spread panic and 
confusion, disrupted the economy, and disrupted key 
government functions.172 The results of this attack were 
therefore severe and arguably in violation of Article 2(4). 
Under the consequence–based or equivalent–effects test, 
the CNOs against Estonia would not rise to the level of an 
armed attack. The CNOs affected government and other key 
websites which were vital to the everyday functioning of 
Estonia. However, there were no deaths or physical destruction 
as a result of the CNOs. The CNOs could not be considered 
similar to an attack by traditional military forces.  
Even when assuming the attacks against Estonia rose to 
the level of a use of force, the CNOs against Estonia can only be 
considered under the laws of war if a state is responsible for the 
CNOs.173 Following the CNOs against Estonia, Estonian 
officials immediately blamed Russia and charged them with 
violating the U.N. Charter.174 Other commentators claimed 
that Russia had made large botnets available for use by groups 
of individuals so that they could more effectively launch CNOs 
 
 167. Michael N. Schmitt, supra note 71, at 577. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 174. WILSON, supra note 14, at 8; see Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of 
Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia, GUARDIAN (May 16, 2007), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia; John 
Leyden, Cyberwarriors on the Eastern Front: In the Line of Fire Packet Floods, 
THE REGISTER (Apr. 25, 2011), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/04/25/estonia_cyberwar_interview/. 
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against the Estonian computer network.175 Computer network 
analysts have found that the CNOs were conducted by 
individual attackers from around the world who communicated 
mostly through Russian chat rooms.176 
Article VIII of the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for International 
Wrongful Acts implicates that there is state control for actions 
when state actors or official organs are “acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State 
in carrying out the conduct.”177 The definition of the word 
“control” has been left for the courts to decide. The 
International Court of Justice established the effective control 
test in Nicaragua v. United States of America.178 The court 
determined that a state has control over non–state actors only 
when the actors act in “complete dependence” on the state.179 In 
contrast, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) established the overall control test in 
Prosecutor v. Tadic.180 The court determined that a state has 
control, or that actions by non–state actors are attributable to 
the state, when the state has a role in organizing, coordinating, 
and providing support for the group.181  
Under the effective control test, the actions of the non–
state actors responsible for the CNOs could not be considered 
under the effective control of Russia because, from the 
information that has been uncovered, Russia was not directing 
the CNOs.182 The CNOs were being sent from one to two 
million compromised computers in 100 jurisdictions around the 
 
 175. Leyden, supra note 174. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Int’l Law Comm’n, 2 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Part 2, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Chapter 
IV.E.1 (Nov. 2001). 
 178. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 110 (June 27); Advisory Council on International 
Affairs & Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, supra 
note 70. 
 179. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 110 (June 27); Advisory Council on International 
Affairs & Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, supra 
note 70. 
 180. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT–94–1–I, Decision on Defense Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Tib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See WILSON, supra note 14, at 8. 
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world. 183 There is no indication that Russian officials were 
directing their operations or that the actors were “completely 
dependent” upon Russia.184 It is unknown whether Russia 
made their botnets available to assist the perpetrators,185 but if 
this could be proven Russia may be responsible for the 
perpetrators’ actions because it knowingly provided support to 
the attackers. Under the overall–control test Russia would be 
supporting the efforts of non–state actors and their actions are 
attributable to the state. This would be considered use of force, 
and thus could be considered an armed attack under the 
target–based approach. The uncertainty regarding the role that 
Russia had in the CNO against Estonia makes it difficult to 
attribute responsibility to Russia for the cyber–attacks.  
The most common challenges under international law are 
the issues of responsibility and attribution. Who is responsible 
for the CNOs? Were the CNOs conducted by a state? Were the 
CNOs conducted by individuals acting alone? Can individual or 
group actions be attributed to the state? Identifying who is 
responsible for a CNO creates serious difficulties for 
distinguishing a CNO as use of force, armed attack, cybercrime, 
or cyber espionage. The Internet creates nearly endless 
opportunities to hide the identity of an attacker. To identify the 
source of a CNO requires associating the Internet Protocol (IP) 
address with an individual, group, or state.186 Attackers can 
create stepping stones between the attacking computer and the 
system used to perpetuate the attack.187 Attackers can also 
create faulty IP addresses which make it look like another 
party is responsible for the attacks.188 If the attackers know 
how to effectively utilize the Internet, it is nearly impossible to 
uncover who is responsible for the attack.  
Since Estonia was unable to attribute responsibility to 
Russia for the cyber–attacks only individuals and groups who 
perpetrated the attacks could be held responsible under 
criminal law. It has been difficult to determine who was 
responsible for the attacks. At this point, only one individual 
 
 183. Leyden, supra note 174. 
 184. See A Cyber–Riot: Estonia Has Faced Down Russian Rioters. But Its 
Websites are Still Under Attack, ECONOMIST (May 10, 2007), 
http://www.economist.com/node/9163598?story_id=9163598. 
 185. See WILSON, supra note 14, at 8. 
 186. Duncan D. Hollis, An e–SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 
398 (2011).  
 187. Id. at 398–99. 
 188. Id.  
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has been prosecuted for the attacks.189 Dmitri Galushkevich, a 
twenty year old ethnic–Russian Estonian, admitted his guilt, 
and was fined the equivalent of $1,200 for attacks against the 
Estonian Prime Minister and leader of the Reform Party, 
Andrus Ansip.190 Galushkevich identified possible targets in 
online chat rooms.191 At this time, no additional individuals, 
groups, or states have been charged with executing the 
attacks.192 
The cyber–attacks against Estonia reflect challenges 
regarding categorization of the CNOs as either a use of force, 
armed attack, or cyber–crime. Cyber–attacks do not always fit 
neatly into one of these categories. How a cyber–attack is 
classified often depends on the test applied. Another issue that 
cyber–attacks raise is determining who is responsible for the 
attack. The answer to this question may decide which law is 
controlling. For instance, Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter are only applicable to cyber–attacks if the attacks can 
be attributed to the state.193 Assigning responsibility, although 
difficult, is necessary to determine whether the U.N. Charter 
provisions on use of force and armed attack apply or whether 
criminal law applies.  
 
B. STUXNET 
Stuxnet, at minimum, is considered to be a use of force. 
Under some tests, Stuxnet could also be considered an armed 
attack as defined by the U.N. Charter. Officials of President 
Barack Obama’s administration admitted that the Stuxnet 
computer worm was a joint project between the United States 
and Israel.194 This admission by the United States makes 
further discussion on state responsibility unnecessary.195  
The Stuxnet attack would constitute a use of force under 
the U.N. Charter. Under the seven factor Schmitt analysis, the 
Stuxnet attack was severe because it caused physical harm to 
property. Stuxnet caused the centrifuges to speed up and slow 
down their rotation causing them to break.196 The breaking of 
 
 189. Leyden, supra note 174. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Wortham, supra note 161, at 648–49. 
 194. Sanger, supra note 22. 
 195. See id. 
 196. Id. 
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the centrifuges constitutes a physical destruction of property 
that rises above the level of a “minor inconvenience or 
irritation.”197 United States officials contend that it set back 
the Iranian nuclear program anywhere from eighteen months 
to two years.198 The consequences were immediate; Stuxnet 
could change the speeds of the centrifuges at the discretion of 
the operators causing them to break.199 As such, the breaking 
of the centrifuges was the direct result of the Stuxnet worm. 
The attack is considered invasive because the Natanz facility 
was supposed to be a secure, secret facility.200 Furthermore, 
because the United States has claimed responsibility for the 
cyber–attack, Stuxnet certainly constitutes a use of force under 
Schmitt’s analysis.  
In contrast, under the result–oriented approach it is 
difficult to say for certain whether the attack reached the 
required level of severity to constitute use of force. While 
Stuxnet only caused centrifuges to break and did not cause 
physical harm to anyone, an argument can be made that the 
consequences of Stuxnet were severe because the Iranian 
program was set back several years. Jeremy Richmond argues 
that Stuxnet did more harm than just the broken 
centrifuges.201 Stuxnet caused shortages of certain types of 
metals and had psychological effects because it infiltrated a 
facility believed to be secure and immune to malware.202 
Additionally, it is likely that Iran had to replace all of its 
computer systems at Natanz, a difficult task for a country 
under severe trade restrictions.203 Whether or not these 
consequences are severe enough to give rise to a use of force 
classification is debatable. That being said, it is likely that the 
Stuxnet attack would be classified as a use of force. 
Another approach to use of force is the consequence–based 
approach.204 Under this approach, the cyber–attack must be 
analogous to the effects of a classic military operation.205 In this 
instance Stuxnet successfully destroyed the centrifuges 
 
 197. See Schmitt, supra note 71, at 576. 
 198. Sanger, supra note 22. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See Richmond, supra note 32, at 859. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Schmitt, supra note 71, at 587–89. 
 205. See id. 
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eliminating the need to use a classic military operation to slow 
the progress of Iran’s nuclear program.206 Stuxnet, therefore, 
performed a task that would have otherwise required a classic 
military operation. Some scholars may argue that the Stuxnet 
attack did not have the required severity or destructive effects 
typically associated with a classic armed attack and, therefore, 
cannot be considered the equivalent of an armed attack. At the 
same time, however, Stuxnet executed an objective that would 
traditionally have required a classic military operation, 
therefore, the Stuxnet attack should be considered an armed 
attack under the consequence–based approach. 
Under the U.N. Charter the Stuxnet cyber–attack would 
qualify as a use of force and would likely also qualify as an 
armed attack under Article 51. Since Stuxnet most likely 
constituted an armed attack whether Iran could lawfully 
respond with military action in self–defense must be analyzed 
within the three requirements of necessity, proportionality, and 
immediacy.207 It is unlikely an Iranian response would meet 
the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy, 
therefore, an armed response to Stuxnet would not be lawful.  
First of all, a response by Iran would not fulfill the 
condition of necessity. The necessity requirement is not met 
because there are remedies that Iran could use in response to 
Stuxnet that do not require force. For example, Iran could take 
action to eradicate Stuxnet from the computer system. If 
Stuxnet is no longer present in the Natanz computer system, 
then it is no longer a threat to Iran. Iran could also lodge a 
complaint with international authorities such as the U.N. 
Security Council. Iran took such legal action on June 20, 2012, 
when Iran’s Communications and Information Technology 
Minister, Reza Taqipour, announced that the Iranian Foreign 
Ministry complained to relevant international organizations.208 
Iran and the United States could also work diplomatically to 
try and reach an agreement prohibiting the use of CNO 
 
 206. See Sanger, supra note 22. 
 207. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 71, at 593–94. 
 208. See, e.g., Iran Complains to World Bodies About Cyber Attacks: 
Minister, PRESSTV, Jun. 20, 2012, 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/20/247120/iran–protests–state–
cyberterrorism/. Iran has yet to disclose precisely which international 
organizations have been made aware of its complaint. See id.; see also Iran 
Complains of Cyberterrorism, UNITED PRESS INT’L, June 20, 2012, 
http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Technology/2012/06/20/Iran–complains–of–
cyberterrorism/UPI–33471340206675/.  
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operations.  
A response by Iran would also have to be proportionate to 
the Stuxnet attack to be lawful. What a proportionate response 
would look like is currently being debated by scholars; some 
argue that a victimized nation can only respond with an in–
kind cyber–attack while other scholars argue that under some 
situations a response using traditional military force would 
satisfy the proportionality requirement.209  
In addition, any response by Iran would most likely be 
tardy and not meet the immediacy requirement. President 
Barack Obama’s administration did not take responsibility for 
Stuxnet until June of 2012, but it was discovered in June 2010, 
any response by Iran would have therefore been two years after 
the discovery of Stuxnet.210 Iran also claims to have eradicated 
Stuxnet with little overall impact on the Iranian nuclear 
program; as such, any action by Iran at this time would be 
taken well after Iran eradicated any remaining Stuxnet threat. 
Furthermore, Stuxnet was scheduled to self–destruct on June 
24, 2012, so any action taken in response to Stuxnet would be 
unnecessary because it is past the date that Stuxnet self–
destructed. Given the above analysis, an armed response by 
Iran to the Stuxnet attack would not meet the three 
requirements of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy and 
would not be lawful under international law. 
Stuxnet raises several important issues with regard to 
cyber–attacks and use of force, armed attack, and self–defense 
under the U.N. Charter. The United States took responsibility 
for the Stuxnet attack thereby making Article 2(4) and Article 
51 of the U.N. Charter applicable. Stuxnet would constitute a 
use of force triggering Iran’s right to respond with non–forceful 
actions and countermeasures. If Stuxnet also rose to the level 
of an armed attack, then Iran may respond in self–defense. 
Iran would not, however, be able to respond with an armed 
attack in self–defense because an armed attack would not meet 
the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy. 
The question remains, under what circumstances would an 
armed attack in self–defense to a cyber–attack be appropriate? 
A nation has yet to respond to a cyber–attack in self–defense, 
 
 209. See Kesan, supra note 13, at 512–14. Some scholars argue that 
responding to a cyber–attack in kind, instead of by traditional military forces, 
is more in line with the principles of international humanitarian law such as 
distinction, humanity, necessity, and proportionality. Id. 
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and scholars continue to debate what type of defensive action 
would be permissible under the principle of proportionality.211  
 
C. FLAME 
Computer experts who have analyzed the Flame virus have 
determined that its primary objective is the collection of 
information.212 Computer analysts at Kaspersky Lab have 
asserted that Flame is so large and complex it must have been 
created by a government.213 Because Flame was deployed by a 
government and because it collects information, it is considered 
cyber–espionage. If the cyber–spies responsible for the attacks 
were ever apprehended they could be prosecuted for espionage 
in any of the states where Flame collected information. The 
possibility that they will ever be tried for espionage is 
infinitesimal. In order to prosecute the victimized nation would 
have to identify the cyber–spies and apprehend them within 
their country because the state responsible is not going to 
extradite their own operatives. Flame is conducting cyber–
espionage but could such an action also be regarded as a use of 
force? 
Identifying the intent behind a CNO may be difficult 
because a CNO is merely computer code and deciphering the 
intent behind computer code alone can be difficult.214 When a 
state is not able to decipher a CNO’s intent it may lead officials 
to assume that they are under attack. The fear of indiscernible 
intent and capabilities of a CNO may lead a trigger happy 
nation to respond with force to a CNO that is engaged only in 
espionage.215 The fear that states may respond aggressively to 
a cyber–espionage operation leads some scholars to assert that 
persistent and aggressive acts of cyber–espionage should be 
treated as a threat of force or use of force under the U.N. 
 
 211. See Kesan, supra note 13, at 512. 
 212. Kaspersky Lab, supra note 34. 
 213. See “Flame” Computer Virus Strikes Middle East; Israel Speculation 
Continues, CBS NEWS (May 29, 2012, 2:26 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301–501465_162–57443071–501465/flame–
computer–virus–strikes–middle–east–israel–speculation–continues/. “Western 
officials with knowledge of the effort” told reporters that the United States 
and Israel developed Flame to collect intelligence in preparation for cyber–
attacks aimed at slowing Iran’s nuclear program. Nakashima, supra note 45. 
 214. See Wortham, supra note 161, at 656. 
 215. See Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyberspace Operations and the Use of 
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Charter.216 
On one hand, a CNO may only have the ability to collect 
information.217 There are other CNOs however, that collect 
information and have the capacity to launch a cyber–attack at 
the operator’s instructions.218 Furthermore, even if the CNO is 
only able to collect information it could potentially be upgraded 
with the required capabilities to launch a cyber–attack if 
needed.219 Scholars note that because CNOs may contain, or be 
updated with, the ability to launch a cyber–attack, and because 
the cyber–espionage and attack operations do not have to be 
mutually exclusive, a targeted country will sometimes not 
know, and have no way of finding out, whether they have been 
exploited or attacked.220  
While the primary objective of Flame appears to be the 
collection of information, a CNO like Flame may have the 
capability to be upgraded to contain a destructive 
component.221 As is, Flame conducts cyber–espionage because it 
collects information on computer displays, and stores data, 
documents and other information.222 However, through an 
upgrade in the software, Flame may have the capability to take 
destructive action such as “destroying the read–only memory 
controlling the boot sequence of the machine where it 
resides.”223 As such, it could be argued that Flame does not—in 
its present state—constitute a use of force because it does not 
have any potential to do damage; that being said, Flame could 
easily be turned into a destructive agent.224 When, if ever, 
should upgrading a CNO to have destructive capabilities be 
considered a threat of force, violating Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter?  
It could be argued that a CNO that is conducting cyber–
espionage but has the capability to launch a cyber–attack is 
analogous to initial troop movements or the massing of troops 
on a border. The CNO is prepared and capable of launching a 
cyber–attack similar to the way troops amassed on a border are 
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prepared and capable of an attack; the CNO is waiting for a 
command to attack the same as traditional troops. Some 
scholars propose that because of the instantaneous ability to 
upgrade a CNO to have destructive potential, cyber–espionage 
should be treated as a possible armed attack from the very 
beginning.225 Despite the arguments for why cyber–espionage 
such as Flame should be considered a threat of force or use of 
force under Article 2(4), most scholars, nations, and analysts 
assert that when a CNO is only collecting information it is 
cyber–espionage. Therefore, cyber–espionage, just like 
traditional espionage, would not be, under traditional 
principles of international law, considered a threat of force or 
use of force under Article 2(4) until the CNO takes action 
beyond collecting data.226  
An additional consideration when analyzing cyber–
espionage is whether a nation that is victim to cyber–espionage 
may ever act in anticipatory self–defense. It would appear that 
cyber–espionage, by itself, would never trigger anticipatory 
self–defense because cyber–espionage is not instantaneous—
there is no immediate threat.227 Cyber–espionage is not 
overwhelming because alone, it does no harm. Cyber–espionage 
leaves ample time for deliberation because it does not create an 
immediate danger.228 However, cyber–espionage paired with an 
exposed vulnerability in the computer software may justify the 
use of anticipatory self–defense.229 If a CNO has infected a 
computer and is conducting cyber–espionage, if the CNO has 
uncovered a weakness in the operations system that is 
vulnerable to attack from the CNO, and if intelligence uncovers 
that the vulnerability will be exposed for an imminent attack, 
then a nation may be able to respond in anticipatory self–
defense.230 The threat is immediate because intelligence has 
 
 225. Melnitzky, supra note 163, at 566–68 (arguing that the distinction 
between corruption of data such as in a cyber–attack and the theft of data in 
cyber–espionage is an “overly mechanical distinction” that ignores the basic 
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uncovered that the attack will be launched imminently. The 
threat is overwhelming because there may be no time for 
computer operators to protect the computer from the attack. 
The immanency of the attack leaves no moment for 
deliberation.  
Under these specifically tailored circumstances, a nation 
may be able to respond in anticipatory self–defense to cyber–
espionage coupled with an exposed vulnerability.231 It is 
important to mention that this ability to respond in 
anticipatory self–defense is undermined if the nation has time 
to create network defenses which will protect the system from 
the cyber–attack. Applying the circumstances surrounding the 
Flame virus, targeted nations would not be able to respond in 
anticipatory self–defense unless Flame was updated with the 
capability to conduct a cyber–attack, the computer system had 
an exposed vulnerability, and government intelligence had 
uncovered that those responsible were going to expose the 
vulnerability for an imminent attack. None of these 
requirements have been met for the Flame operation meaning 
that the affected nations would not be able to legally respond 
with anticipatory self–defense under the Caroline Criteria. 
Schmitt has proposed that anticipatory self–defense may 
be used if three factors are present: (1) the CNO is part of an 
overall operation that will culminate in an armed attack; (2) 
the CNO is an irrevocable step toward an armed attack; (3) the 
action in self–defense occurs at the last possible moment to 
counter the attack.232 This approach poses a very high standard 
which cyber–espionage operations would not ordinarily 
reach.233 A cyber–espionage operation would rarely, if ever, 
constitute an irrevocable step toward an armed attack; 
therefore, under Schmitt’s approach, a state would not be able 
to act in anticipatory self–defense to a cyber–espionage 
operation. 
Flame is a CNO which has the primary purpose of 
conducting cyber–espionage. Under a traditional analysis, 
Flame does not constitute a threat or use of force or an armed 
attack under the U.N. Charter. Some scholars have proposed 
that because of the CNO’s unique ability to upgrade from 
conducting cyber–espionage to cyber–attacks and the inability 
to determine the intent of a CNO, cyber–espionage should be 
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considered a threat of use of force or a use of force under Article 
2(4). While this proposition is supported by some analysts, most 
scholars and nations find that cyber–espionage is the same as 
traditional espionage and should be viewed as a violation of 
domestic criminal law. Additionally, while cyber–espionage in 
itself cannot trigger anticipatory self–defense, cyber–espionage 
coupled with a computer network vulnerability may trigger the 
ability to use anticipatory self–defense under the Caroline 
Criteria. Applying the Schmitt approach cyber–espionage 
would rarely, if ever, trigger the ability to use anticipatory self–
defense. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Correct identification of CNOs as a threat or use of force, 
armed attack, a crime, or espionage depends on the scale of the 
attack, attribution, intent, and consequences. The unique 
nature of CNOs makes it difficult to determine which legal 
paradigm is applicable and what response is legally 
appropriate. As the capabilities and application of CNOs 
continue to expand, the international community will be faced 
over and over again with the task of determining which legal 
paradigm should be applied to CNOs.  
So what should the international community do to deal 
with the threat posed by CNOs? The remainder of this article 
will analyze the three main approaches proposed to regulate 
CNOs: (1) a non–proliferation treaty, (2) a treaty or code of 
conduct containing normative rules and legal obligations, and 
(3) development of state practice in a way that will create 
customary international norms which the existing 
international legal regime cannot address. 
 
A. NON–PROLIFERATION TREATY 
Michael Rake, chairman of BT Group PLC,234 and many 
other scholars have suggested that a cyber–non–proliferation 
treaty, similar to those for weapons of mass destruction, must 
be developed.235 Supporters of a non–proliferation treaty 
suggest that the ability of cyber–attacks to completely 
dismantle a state demands the implementation of a non–
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proliferation treaty.236 There are currently several treaties, 
export control regimes, and codes of conduct which address the 
non–proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.237 These 
non–proliferation treaties make the distinction “between the 
nuclear haves and the nuclear have–nots.”238 They require that 
those nations which have nuclear weapons reduce their arsenal 
and not impair other nation’s peaceful use of nuclear energy 
while those nations which do not have nuclear–weapons agree 
not to develop them.239 Scholars have suggested that a cyber–
non–proliferation treaty is not realistic because there is no way 
of making a distinction between those who have cyber–weapons 
and those that do not.240 Furthermore, ensuring that nations do 
not develop this technology would be impossible because the 
actual possession of cyber–attack technology can be difficult to 
detect; such technology can be developed and tested in secret.241 
The implementation of a cyber–non–proliferation treaty, 
therefore, is not a workable solution for the threat posed by 
CNOs. 
 
B. CYBER–TREATY OR CODE OF CONDUCT CONTAINING 
NORMATIVE RULES 
There are several different approaches which may be used 
for developing an international treaty. A treaty may be created 
which bans cyber–attacks altogether. This treaty would be 
similar to the Mine Ban Treaty which bans the use, stockpiling, 
production, and transfer of landmines because of the harm that 
landmines cause civilians.242 Similar to landmines a multi–
national cyber–treaty banning cyber–attacks would have 
support because of the potential negative impact such an attack 
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would have on civilians.243 Any use of force in self–defense 
under the U.N. Charter requires that it meet the requirements 
of military necessity, distinction between civilians and military 
targets, proportionality, and avoidance of unnecessary 
suffering.244 Because cyber–attacks can “escape” from their 
original target and affect civilians, it could be argued that such 
attacks do not distinguish between civilians and non–
civilians.245 In addition, they may cause civilians unnecessary 
suffering because when such viruses “get loose” they may cause 
unnecessary damage to programs and institutions which are 
vital to civilian infrastructure. Scholars and nations have 
therefore proposed the creation of a treaty banning the use of 
cyber–attacks because of these potentially devastating effects. 
A second approach would be to develop a treaty or code of 
conduct which deliberately addresses what type of conduct 
would be considered a cyber–attack and what responses would 
be appropriate under the circumstances. A treaty such as this 
would complement and clarify existing regulations regarding 
use of force in the U.N. Charter and customary international 
law.246 Russia has advocated for the establishment of a cyber–
attack treaty for over ten years.247 In addition, the 
International Telecommunications Union Secretary General 
Hamadoun Toure has been a vocal supporter of a treaty in 
which countries would agree not to make a cyber–attack 
against another state.248  
Scholars contend that a treaty which bans the use of 
cyber–attacks or limits their use is not realistic because there 
is currently no way to ensure compliance.249 CNOs can be 
developed in secret and tested in secret. In addition, they can 
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be coded and routed in a way which makes state attribution 
nearly impossible. Nations can therefore not be monitored in 
any meaningful way to ensure state compliance with the 
treaty.250 Any code of conduct containing normative rules would 
be undermined by the inability to monitor and attribute 
responsibility. 
 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE PRACTICE 
Stephanie Handler proposes that instead of developing a 
cyber–treaty, “[a] better option is to focus on developing state 
practice in a rational way that develops patches where the 
existing legal regime is not optimally suited to cyberspace 
operations.”251 Handler claims that a focus on state practice 
that corresponds to current international law will help develop 
new customary international law norms.252 Since it is unlikely 
that states will come together to create a cyber–treaty, 
customary international law, developed through state practice, 
will be the primary method for the formation of cyber–space 
laws.253 In addition to state practice, the decisions and opinions 
of international courts regarding CNOs will assist in the 
development of international law norms. The development of 
customary international law in the area of cyber–space 
operations will take time. For now, scholars must take a wait–
and–see approach to see how states react to cyberspace 
operations and their fast–developing technologies. 
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